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SCHROEDER SCHOLAR-IN-RESIDENCE LECTURE

POLITICS, DEATH, AND NATURE*
Ronald Dworkin**
I HAVE GIVEN A RATHER FORBIDDING title to
this lecture. But my claim really is a large one: I shall argue
that a set of deep philosophical, even religious issues lies at the
heart of four contemporary political controversies which are
among the most heated of our day. I have written in one way
or another about three of them; abortion, health care, and euthanasia. I have not yet written about genetic engineering,
which is the fourth of the topics that I want to discuss. Indeed,
I hope to use this occasion to begin to think about that one,
and my remarks are accordingly tentative.
The first of these issues - health care - has produced a
kind of American political tragedy. I thought, when the debate
about health care reform started a few years ago, that if the
United States proved unable, in this decade, seriously to reform
the delivery of health care, that would show us to be ourselves
a sick society. I have no reason to withdraw that depressing
diagnosis now. The health care debate was corrupted by our
inability collectively to focus on the question that ought to
have been at the center of the argument. How much should we
spend, as a nation, on health care; and how should we distribute, person-by-person, what we do choose to spend? There are
many reasons, of course, why President Clinton's health care
bill went down to such a crushing, sad defeat. Nobody expected the bill to pass as originally drafted. But many people expected, and I was among them until close to the end, that some

* Professor Dworkin spoke extemporaneously. His lecture was taped, and this is an
edited version of the transcript.
** Ronald Dworkin is a Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. He is
also Professor of Jurisprudence and Fellow of University College, Oxford University.
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substantial reform would be achieved. Though there are, as I
said, many reasons why even this expectation was disappointed, a failure to appreciate what respect for life requires was
among them.
Of course, that same issue is central to the second great
controversy I mentioned - over abortion. Many people, again,
including me, hoped that the 1993 decision by the Supreme
Court in PlannedParenthoodof Pennsylvania v. Casey' would
finally persuade the nation that Roe v. Wade2 is here to stay,
though perhaps subject to new and uncertain exceptions. But
that hope has so far been disappointed. When President Clinton
nominated, as his Surgeon General, Dr. Henry Foster, who had
himself performed abortions, the issue flared up again, and it
now looks as if the fundamentalist right-wing of the Republican party will have enough power to insure that that party's
next nominee for President shares their fundamentalist views
about abortion.
The sanctity of life is also at the core of the third issue I
cited: euthanasia. This issue has recently leapt into the headlines. Oregon, as you know, became the first jurisdiction in the
world to make doctor-assisted suicide legal.' People often say
that euthanasia is legal in Holland. In fact, it is still technically
a crime there for a doctor to assist people who are anxious to
end their lives. Courts and the government have made clear,
however, that if certain guidelines are followed, the doctor will
not be prosecuted. So the situation in that country is tantamount to euthanasia's being legal if those guidelines are followed. But Oregon is the first jurisdiction to have taken the
step of making some forms of euthanasia legal in theory as
well as in practice.
A year ago, a district court judge in the state of Washington ruled that a law prohibiting doctor-assisted suicide under
any circumstances is unconstitutional.4 She cited the Supreme

1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See Carey Goldberg, OregonBracesfor New FightOn Helping the Dying to Die, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 17, 1997, atA1.
4. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd & remandedsub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997).
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Court's decision in Casey that I mentioned a moment ago, and
said that the right to sovereignty over personal decisions involving quasi-religious issues, which the Supreme Court recognized in that case, applied to the case of assisted suicide as
well. Her decision has since been overruled by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,5 whose decision will, in turn, be appealed to the Supreme Court. If that Court reverses again, the
entire United States would be required, by the Constitution, to
follow Oregon's lead.
The final political controversy I have in mind, which is, as
I said, over genetic engineering, is nascent rather than fullblown, and Professor Mehiman, together with others in this
faculty, are among the leading students of the questions it
raises. Scientists now offer a variety of substitutes for what
most people would regard as the natural technique of human
reproduction, and they can invade and alter the genetic structure of human beings. But people, not surprisingly, are doubtful about how far the techniques that medical science has provided actually should be used. The sanctity of life is at the
center of that nascent argument, too, though in this case the
issue is put in terms not of respect for life, but of respect for
nature.
Should an enlightened society defer to what might be
called the natural way of doing things? Does such deference,
when appropriate, require abstaining from scientific investigation into certain matters, or from the practical deployment of
what such investigation may reveal? Modem philosophers have
on the whole been skeptical about the very idea of the "natural." On their view, anybody who objects to interfering with
so-called natural processes is a Luddite or troglodyte. And yet,
in the last three of the political debates I just mentioned, partisans on one side insist that those on the other side are wrong
because they advocate interfering with nature, and are therefore
playing God. I shall later, toward the end of my remarks, show
some sympathy for that point of view. But not yet.
First, I want to look at the concept of nature that this point
of view uses, by summarizing some of the themes of my recent

5.

Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (1995).
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book, Life's Dominion.6 I discuss, in the context of abortion
and euthanasia, the idea of the "sacred," and, in particular, the
effervescent claim that human life is sacred. What value do we
have in mind when we appeal to the sanctity of life? What
kind of an argument are we actually making? Let me start, by
way of explanation, with the somewhat more inclusive idea of
what philosophers call "intrinsic value," and the place that idea
has in politics generally.
When government constrains your liberty and mine, it can
appeal to two very different kinds of justifications for doing so.
On the one hand, it can appeal to the interest of human beings
and other sentient creatures, and to the rights safeguarding
those interests that at least some of those creatures have. If you
ask why is it legitimate for government to make murder and
arson crimes, the natural answer is that those activities deliberately threaten the most important interests of people, and that
government's principal responsibility is to identify those interests and protect them through criminal and civil law. That is a
perfectly straightforward explanation. But there is a second
kind of justification that government often uses when it limits
your liberty. It appeals not to the interests of human beings or
other creatures, but to intrinsic values that are distinct from
such interests. Government imposes special constraints and expense on you to save giant forests, not just because or if people want to look at or walk in those forests, but because the
forests are ancient and wonderful. Government taxes you to establish museums, not just because or if people want to study
great paintings and sculptures, but to honor those paintings and
sculptures because they are great. Government imposes other
constraints and incurs other expense to protect endangered
species, not because people's lives would be less interesting
with no spotted owls to spot, but because it is a shame when a
species perishes because of what we do.
I have now mentioned two kinds of objects many of us
treat as intrinsically valuable: great art and natural resources,
including species. Now I want to add a third item to the catalogue: each and every human life. You may be surprised that I
6. RONALD DwoRKIN, LIFE's DOMINION (1993). Readers interested in the issues I discuss
in the next several paragraphs should consult that book for a fuller treatment.
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say that human life is intrinsically valuable. You might think
life's value lies in the interests people have in their own lives.
It is true that protecting someone's life is normally in that person's interests. But the case of euthanasia, which I'm going to
speak about again shortly, is an important exception to that
generalization. Many people believe that government has a
responsibility to protect the intrinsic value of a human life even
when this is not in the interest of the person whose life it is even when, that is, it would be in that person's interest to die
sooner rather than later. So intrinsic value is a different kind of
value from interests, even in the case of human life. The claim
that something has intrinsic value means that its value is independent from what people want or what is in their interests to
have.
The sacred is a narrower category, within the category of
intrinsic value. Many things are intrinsically valuable in what
we might call an incremental sense: the more we have of them
the better. Knowledge is an example of an incrementally intrinsic value. At least in principle, the more we know about the
origin of the solar system or of the universe, for example, the
better. Human life is not like that. We do not think that the
more human life the better - at least many of us do not. Indeed many people think it urgent to keep the world's population down. They think the fewer human beings the better - at
least up to a point. So we need a separate category of value,
and I have suggested that we use the word "sacred" to describe
it. Something is sacred if we have no obligation to bring it into
existence, but do owe it honor once it exists.
What can give something - a work of art, a natural species, or a human life - that kind of status? I suggest that there
are two sources of sacred value. One source lies in human
creation: something is sacred if it is the work of a human being
that expresses creative genius. A second source is nature:
something can come to be sacred if it is the consequence of a
natural process, which we respect simply on the ground that it
is the way things actually have happened. An endangered species is sacred because eons of geology and evolution produced
it. These two dimensions of the sacred - the personal and
then the natural - come together in you. The Greeks had two
words for human life: zoF"and bios. Zo" meant, as entomology
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teaches, life as part of nature, the biological fact of the life.
And bios was the life that we create, the kind of life that is
written up in our biography. So we are sacred in two ways, an
intersection of two sources of value. Nature produced us as a
work of its art, and we make something of our own lives,
something we have created as a kind of work of art of our
own.
What should politics have to do with the sacred? John
Stuart Mill, if I understand him right, answered: "Nothing." He
said that a decent government restricts liberty for only one
purpose: to protect the interests of other people. It must not
limit what you and I can do out of the respect for any intrinsic
value of any kind.7 Many liberals find his view congenial,
because it keeps government out of the business of telling us
what values to hold. That sharp separation of state from ethics,
as you know, reflects an old and honored liberal impulse. But
we cannot accept it, can we? Because if we say that government cannot limit liberty just to protect intrinsic value, we
must bid good-bye to conservation on the scale we want it. We
cannot argue for conservation on the ground that it protects the
interests of future generations because future generations have
no interests. Since what we do determines not only how many
people there will be, but who they will be, it is a kind of nonsense to say what we do now can injure or benefit their interests. So we need the concept of intrinsic value to justify longterm conservation.
Of course we do need to restrict the power of government
to compromise liberty for the sake of fundamental values, and
if we cannot accept Mill's flat separation, we need a more
subtle one. We might begin, in our search for this, with an
ethical principle that I believe almost all of you accept. We
might call this the principle of ethical individualism. We have
ultimate responsibility one by one, person by person, for deciding what an appropriate life for us is, and for doing our best
to live that life. That does not mean that we make ethical judgments in a vacuum; it does not mean that we are not influenced by our culture. But people who accept the principle of

7. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
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ethical individualism nevertheless insist on ethical independence. They insist that government may not limit their liberty
when its only justification for doing so is commitment to some
controversial theory about what makes human lives valuable or
gives meaning to human life or makes a particular human life
successful, because deciding these questions is the duty of people one by one, for themselves. This principle of independence
is much more discriminating than Mill's principle. It does not
prohibit government from acting for the sake of artistic heritage or conservation or to protect future generations. Government need not rely on any position about the deep ethical
issues I just described when it denies me the right to tear down
my Georgian house.
Of course, some of the laws that government enacts and
enforces do make it more difficult for me to live one kind of
life rather than another. Indeed some of them make it more
likely that I will end up holding one set of ethical beliefs rather
than another. It would be impossible for government to avoid
acts having such consequences. But it must not aim at such
consequences: it must not limit liberty when its only justification is that either officials or the majority of voters prefer one
answer to the essential, core ethical questions of why life is
important and what a successful life is, an answer that some of
those whose liberty is reduced reject.
Now I'll return - some of you may think not before time
to the political controversies I said I was going to discuss.
The principle of ethical independence is evidently at stake in
the abortion and euthanasia debates, and it is also at stake,
though less evidently so, in the health care debate and the
nascent debate about genetic engineering. Let us start with the
health care debate. I have been arguing for two propositions.
The first is a principle of politics: that though government may
sometimes properly legislate when its justification is respect for
intrinsic values, including sacred values, it may not do this
when its justification rests on the assumption of the superiority
of one answer to core ethical questions to other answers. The
second is a philosophical distinction between two sources of
the sacred - two strands that make up our conviction that
human life is sacred - the personal strand, which begins in
the idea that a person creates his or her own life, and the natu-
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ral strand which reminds us that we are part of the biological
world and that our lives have intrinsic value for that reason as
well. My two propositions can now be joined in the following
way. The four political controversies turn on the relative importance of these two strands of the sacred, vis ii vis each other. When the question of their relative importance divides us
on ethical grounds, the principle of ethical independence commends freedom.
Theories about justice and health have been dominated for
many centuries by an idea I have elsewhere called the principle
of rescue.8 This principle declares that the most important
value of all is biological life and health, and that no expense
should be spared when the consequence of sparing expense
would be death or disease that can be avoided. That seems a
very honorable principle. It has been defended by philosophers
from Descartes to now. It is a dangerous principle, however,
because the political consequence of embracing it is almost
inevitably less public provision for health care rather than
more. People embrace it, and then say that, of course, it would
be impossible that any community - or indeed any individual
in his or her own life - to honor it in full. That is true. No
one could lead a decent life if he spent every penny not needed
for basic food or shelter on buying the most expensive possible
health insurance that would guarantee every possible medical
treatment that could conceivably increase the length of his life
by a day. Nor could a community provide decent lives for its
members if it tried to provide medical care for everyone, up to
the point where further care would not increase anyone's life
expectancy even marginally. But so long as we subscribe to the
principle of rescue, which commands exactly that, as setting
the right standard for public provision of health, we can say
that it must be left to "politics" to decide how far we should
go toward the ideal we accept, but cannot satisfy in full. That
is an invitation, of course, for inaction - when people say that
something should be left to politics, that ordinarily means that
it should be left to selfishness.

8. See Ronald Dworkin, Health Security Act: Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?, N. Y. REV.
BooKs, Jan. 13, 1994, at 20; Ronald Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, 38
McGmL LJ. 883 (1993).
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So it is important to consider whether the principle of
rescue is acceptable, even as an ideal. It presupposes the complete dominance of one strand of the sacred - the natural over the other strand, which is the personal. Once we understand this - once we accept that there must be a trade-off
between life as zo" and life as bios - we must re-examine the
rescue principle in that light, and reject it unless we find, on
reflection, that we do think that any increase in the length of
the former, no matter how small, is worth the sacrifice of any
amount of value in the character of the latter, no matter how
great. Think about this in the following way. Suppose a young
woman has, at the age of twenty, a choice between two health
insurance policies covering the rest of her life. One policy
would be phenomenally expensive - it would cost, in annual
premiums, practically all the money she has, but it would guarantee her that any medical treatment, high-tech diagnostics, or
heroic and speculative surgery like organ transplants, for example, would be available no matter how much it cost so long as
it held out even a tiny hope of prolonging her life. The other
plan would offer her a much reduced level of care. It would
stipulate, for a much more modest premium, that she would be
entitled to the medical care, over her life, that was deemed
appropriate, according to contemporary medical standards,
given her condition and prognosis. If she thought about life in
all its dimensions, if she cared about bios as well as zoF, she
would of course buy the second policy. If she bought the first,
there would be nothing to her life except its length; it would be
a life not worth living. Of course the health care debate involves much more than the question whether the rescue principle should be embraced in principle, and I have written elsewhere about how the hypothetical insurance policy test I just
described might be used to help design a fair system of health
care distribution.9 My purpose now is only to show how the
competition between the two sources of the sacred, the natural
and the personal, figures, hidden, in the health care debate.
The abortion argument has been confused because most
people think it is centrally an argument about the question of

9.

See Dworkin, Health Security Act, supra note 8.
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whether a fetus is a person from the moment of its conception.
That is not a well-formed question, however, because "person"
is fatally ambiguous. We should substitute a different, clearer
question. Does a human fetus, from the moment of its conception, have interests of its own? I believe the answer to that
question is: "no it does not." A creature cannot have interests
unless it has or has had a mental life. But that is not the end of
the abortion controversy, because there is another issue to
consider, and in my view this is the issue that most people
who agonize about abortion are really worrying about. How far
does respect for the sanctity of human life mean respect for the
natural rather than the personal dimension of that life? If you
think, as many people do, that the natural dimension is preeminent, then you will think that any act that ends a human
life prematurely is a savage insult - the greatest possible insult - to that value, even if no one's interests are thereby
violated or injured.
But once you recognize, as you did in the discussion of
health care, that the personal dimension of life's sanctity may
conflict with the natural or biological dimension, then a more
difficult issue arises, because respect for the life of the fetus
may conflict with respect for the life of its mother. Does it
really show respect for the sanctity of the life of a teenage
mother, who is little more than a child herself, to forbid her an
abortion? It shows no disrespect for the natural dimension of
her life, because, except in rare cases, her biological life isn't
threatened. But her power to make something of her life, to
add a personal, creative dimension to its value, will be threatened, and may be destroyed. You may then think, as I do, that
in some circumstances abortion shows more respect for the
sanctity of human life overall, in spite of its injury to the natural dimension of a fetus's life, because it shows respect for a
woman's creative power over her own life.
And then, whether or not you agree with that judgment,
you will see the pertinence of the political principle of ethical
independence. Because once the idea is set aside that an early
fetus can have interests of its own, constraints on abortion
cannot be justified as action to protect those interests. They can
be justified only on a ground that the principle of independence
rules out: by endorsing one view about the sanctity of human
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life - that the natural dimension dominates over the personal
dimension - and limiting liberty in an absolutely crucial respect by imposing that view on women who reject it. If I am
right in what I said earlier, that is unjustifiable in a community
of people who accept the responsibilities of ethical individualism. So you will not be surprised to hear that I think the Supreme Court has reached roughly the right position on the
abortion issue.
What about euthanasia? As I said earlier, the Ninth Circuit
has reversed a district court decision recognizing a constitutional right, in some circumstances, to the assistance of a doctor in
committing suicide. The opinion for the Ninth Circuit was
written by Judge John Noonan, who as many of you know is a
Catholic philosopher whom Reagan appointed to that court.
Noonan criticized the district court's assumption that the rationale of the Casey decision about abortion applies to euthanasia
as well; he said that the two issues are very different." But
are they? I just argued that an essential principle of liberty is at
stake in the abortion issue: the principle of ethical independence. Isn't that principle even more evidently at stake in the
euthanasia debate? Some people, it is true, think that a fetus
has interests of its own from the instant of conception. But if
that were so, it would argue, if anything, for more liberty in
euthanasia. How could anyone think, on any assumption, that
ethical independence was less at stake in that issue?
Once again, the question of balance between the two
strands or components of the sanctity of life dominates personal opinion about euthanasia. Which dominates in your own
conviction? Do you think that life is sacred primarily because
of the natural dimension of its history or because of the personal dimension? Do you think it is sacred because a human
being is a crucial part of the biological world, or because making a human life is the greatest creative act available to almost
any of us? Presumably, both. But which is more in the foreground in the circumstances in which euthanasia might be
contemplated?
It is sometimes said that people tempted to euthanasia are
10. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd & remanded
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. CL 2258 (1997).
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selfish in wanting to avoid pain, that they fail to appreciate the
fundamental, objective importance of their own lives. The
philosopher, John Locke, made that point when he insisted that
you do not own your own life; you are only a trustee of it.
God owns your life. Locke's view is a metaphorical statement
of the conviction that the natural dimension dominates life's
sacred value. But if you resist that conviction, in order to give
more role to the personal dimension, you will appreciate that
people's concern about the way they die can reflect not indifference to, but on the contrary great respect for, the objective
importance of their lives. If you think that ending your life
intubated, connected to a hundred machines, drugged near
sedation - if you think that would be a terrible way to finish
a life you are proud of having created - then you will think
that euthanasia does not deny genuine respect for the intrinsic
value of your life, but on the contrary, confirms it. So, once
again, we see the crucial, pivotal role of a deep ethical issue in
framing people's reactions to euthanasia. We also see the pertinence and importance of the principle of ethical independence,
which demands that people be free to make their own decisions
and commitments about such deep ethical issues. This is a
paradigm case when government would itself show deep disrespect for persons by attempting to force the same ethical conviction on everyone.
I have tried to call your attention, in discussing each of
the three great controversies about health care, abortion, and
euthanasia, to conflicts between the two different components
of respect for human life, and to how personal convictions
about the relative importance of the two components shape
opinion and account for differences. I have been emphasizing,
moreover, the importance of the personal as distinct from the
natural component, because the personal component is overlooked or subordinated in the orthodox or traditional opinions.
It is subordinated by the rescue principle, and in the view that
abortion and euthanasia are acts of selfishness contemptible of
the sanctity of life. The fourth issue, however, to which I now
turn, is dramatically different.
When I speak of genetic engineering, I have in mind a
whole set of advances in medical technology pertinent to the
reproduction of our species. To simplify, I will consider these
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advances under three heads. First, improvements in the mechanics of reproduction, how it is done. There was a time
when there was only one way to produce another generation of
human beings. But now we have discovered in vitro fertilization and implantation, and heaven knows what else just around
the comer. Perhaps sex will one day become purely recreational, and no one will associate it, except as a matter of history or
mistake, with reproduction.
The second category of technological advance lies in selection. Doctors are now able to analyze genetic material in
enough detail so as to guide decisions about which such material will be induced or allowed to develop into a life in earnest.
They can provide massive amounts of information about the
potentialities of each product of in vitro fertilization, for example, to guide decisions about which to implant, or about a fetus
in utero to guide decisions about abortion.
The third category embraces genetic engineering in a more
literal sense. That is the enterprise of manipulating, cutting out,
replacing, or enhancing genes so as to transform the genetic
structure of a particular human being into a different genetic
structure. Once again, if you surrender a bit to fantasy, you
might imagine that newly married couples, instead of meeting
with their architect or interior designer to plan their house, will
meet with their geneticist to plan, in minute detail, which arrangement of genes they will become parents to. I asked a
friend, who is the editor of a distinguished science magazine,
whether this was a realistic fantasy. "Oh, no," he said. "That is
complete science fiction. It will take years." I found that rather
chilling.
Now, of course, in assessing the desirability of any of
these changes in human reproductive technology, we must
make a crude but essential distinction between the motives that
might drive people to exploit the technology. We should distinguish between the motive to prevent disease and suffering, on
the one hand, and to secure or enhance personal qualities we
find desirable, on the other. It is difficult to deny the legitimacy of at least some genetic decisions guided by the first motive. Plainly, if some way is discovered that would allow docto prevent
tors to cure genetic defects in a fetus Huntington's Chorea, for example - it would be madness to
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object. Selection for the same ends is at least superior to selection for other reasons. If doctors know that a particular fertilized ovum carries a gene that will produce a crippling disease,
it makes sense for them to choose another ovum to implant.
Many people object to abortion for any reason. But even most
of them believe that it is morally less wicked to abort a fetus
that will inevitably be born maimed, or develop a terrible disease early in its life, than a fetus that is normal. I mention
these relatively "easy" cases to set them aside, because I want
to focus on the more problematic cases of the other kind.
Let us concentrate on a particular example, taken from the
"fictional" category. Is there anything wrong with parents
deciding on genetic manipulation or therapy in order to produce a taller, stronger, physically more attractive, intellectually
more powerful child? Many people think there is: they say, in
the phrase I mentioned earlier, that this would be "playing
God." But what is wrong with playing God? Some people answer that since the technology needed would be expensive, and
could not be provided for everyone who wanted it, allowing
some to have it would add yet further to the great disparity
between the rich and the poor. That is a valid consideration,
but it cannot explain the sense of horror with which some
people - perhaps most people - greet the prospect of genetic
enhancement. After all, we tolerate savage and growing inequality already. Our impulse, moreover, in addressing this inequality, is to try to extend to the poor what the rich have, not
to deny it to the rich because the poor can not have it.
So we need a better answer to the question of what is
wrong with playing God, and we cannot find one, I think,
without going back to the idea that human life is sacred, and to
the natural, biological component in that idea. We must now
realize that, though the two components I distinguished may be
thought to conflict, as in the cases of abortion and euthanasia,
they are in other crucial ways complementary. Our world the intellectual, ethical, moral space we live in - is fundamentally divided into two domains. The first is the domain of
responsibility - of choice, virtue, blame, and the affective
emotions of pride and resentment. The second is the domain of
the natural, the given, the domain of luck. The second is indispensable to the first; it is indispensable to us that some features
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of ourselves and our situation are just given; are no one's fault;
no one's choice; just the luck of the draw; the throw of the
dice; what nature did; and what nobody is to blame for. The
far-fetched science fiction examples that recent advances in genetic engineering tempt us to imagine are instructive about why
the second of these domains really is indispensable to the first.
I have emphasized the responsibility most of us feel for
making something of our own lives. We do this, however,
against the background of a situation we take as a given and
for granted. Each of us in effect asks, about himself or herself,
a question of this form: given a person with roughly my projected life span, with roughly my talents and non-talents, my
inclinations and my motors of gratification, what life is appropriate to a person like that? But suppose we had to ask fundamental ethical questions with absolutely nothing given? Or
even with radically less given than now is? Imagine the parents
of my fantasy approaching the genetic designer with the intention of designing, for their child, a good life. They would have
to ask, more or less in the abstract, what a good life is in general, starting from a blank slate, and it is unclear how even to
begin to think about that.
Now consider the role of the given in the various reactive
and affective emotions I mentioned. Someone who writes a
brilliant poem, or paints a great painting, or proves Fermat's
last theorem, or, to come down to earth, plays a good round of
golf, rightly takes pride in this achievement, and that adds a
particular and distinct kind of pleasure to life. Someone's
achievement is, after all, something he has done. That assumption, and the pleasure it can bring, are not vulnerable to embarrassments about determinism. Suppose it is you who has shot
the marvelous round of golf, and your friend asks, "Why are
you so pleased with yourself? Nature fixed this up eons ago:
the mechanics of the terrain, the properties of the particular
blades of grass that cover it, and the dynamics of your intentions and muscular structure made what you have just done
absolutely inevitable." I doubt that any of that would undercut
your pleasure, or ruin the taste of the drink that you have
raised to celebrate.
But suppose someone was able to say, "You did not do
that, the committee that designed you did. They anticipated the
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lie of the greens, and designed you to perform well on them."
This is very different because, as lawyers know, the distinction
between what nature has done and what other people did is at
the center of our moral life. All our notions of responsibility
hinge on the distinction not between us and our nature, but
between us and other people. This, too, can be thrown into
jeopardy. Children have enough scope for resentment as it is.
Suppose their resentment embraced not just what their parents
did or did not give them or do for them, but how they made
them. The crucial intergenerational sense of independence
would be forfeit.
I am not, you understand, making an argument against
research. I am just trying to identify the sources of our shared
anxiety at some of the prospects opened up by recent discoveries, and to display a different kind of relation between the
personal and the natural. I hope you will let me end these
tentative remarks, then, with a bit of outrageously doctored
history. We might, if we try, see the opinions of different ages
shifting in their assessment of the relative importance of the
two dimensions of the sacred, or, at least, in the attention they
give them. From prehistory until, say, the Renaissance, the
natural was dominant in most people's conception of what it is
that is sacred about human life. That is hardly surprising because for most people during that long age, the natural was the
divine, and the divine usually incorporates and subordinates the
personal. The Greek gods, for example, made works of art of
their own lives and human beings were only bits of the plot,
and the Christian God made men and women in His image.
A different balance became popular, however, during the
humanist era that stretches back at least to the quattrocento, at
one end, and produced the Woodstock Nation five centuries
later. That different balance takes what is really wonderful to
be the creation of a free and uninhibited human spirit, the
personal, that is, as distinct from the natural. While the conventional religious balance subordinates the personal to the
natural, the romantic balance reverses the structure: it gave
nature romantic pretension, and therefore made it part of what
people had created. Now we may be in the foothills of a rather
different era, in which the possibility of science dramatically
altering nature forces on us a new sense of nature's indepen-

1996]

DEATH, POLIJTICS,AND NATURE

dence and independent importance. We see the personal and
the natural bound together in a different way, not in a conflict
in which one dominates over and finally absorbs the other in
our consciousness, but rather in a symbiosis essential to both.
In any case, whether or not this crude schematic structure
is illuminating, it is too early to speculate about the more precise form the new kind of balance should take. It is even too
early to see very clearly how the principle of ethical independence would figure in it. It is not too early, however, for a
warning. Because ethics and the given are so densely interconnected, playing God means playing with fire. That is apocalyptic enough for a sunny afternoon.
POSTSCRIPT
I have had an opportunity to read Mr. Levin's interesting
essay, and I do not believe that we disagree. The principle of
ethical independence I described stipulates that though government may sometimes limit people's liberty to make personal
judgments about ethical value when it acts to protect
someone's interests, including theirs, it may not limit such
liberty when its only justification for doing so is its commitment to a controversial theory of intrinsic ethical value. Mr.
Levin offers examples of government acting in the way the
principle permits, that is, to protect interests. Government may
believe, for example, that a love-sick adolescent, who thinks he
will never recover from his depression, is almost certainly
wrong, and it may try to prevent his suicide out of a paternalistic concern for his interests. It may plausibly think that certain
genetic decisions potential parents wish to make, in our present
state of relative scientific ignorance, may have dangerous, even
disastrous, consequences for interests of other people, including
their children, and it may limit parental liberty for that reason.
There is nothing in either supposition that contradicts the principle I described, or the version of liberalism that embraces it.
In the last section of the Article I cited very different concerns
that might well suggest the need to limit the principle of ethical individualism, not to protect interests, as in Mr. Levin's
examples, but to protect the balance between the worlds of
responsibility and of nature in our thought and experience. I
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meant, in that discussion, not to be defending the principle, but
calling attention to a new kind of challenge to it.

